Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 43 | Issue 1

2010

Lawfare and U.S. National Security
Orde F. Kittrie

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare and U.S. National Security, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 393 (2010)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol43/iss1/23

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

File: Kittrie 2

Created on: 1/13/2011 7:36:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:08:00 PM

LAWFARE AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
Professor Orde F. Kittrie*
The increasing legalization of international relations has made law
an increasingly powerful alternative to traditional military means to
achieve operational objectives. Terrorist groups and their state sponsors
have made explicit use of such “lawfare” to achieve their operational objectives. The U.S. government’s response to law’s potential as a tool for
advancing national security objectives has thus far been predominantly
defensive. The United States should not only fight back hard against terrorists’ use of lawfare but also more vigorously look for ways to itself so use
law. Lawfare is less deadly than traditional warfare. Also, the U.S.’s advantage in sophisticated legal weapons is surely even greater than its advantage in sophisticated lethal weapons. The article suggests how the United
States could more effectively deploy some types of lawfare as a tool for
promoting its national security objectives. It takes as a case study the uses
and potential uses of lawfare against Iran.
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The increasing legalization of international relations has made law
an increasingly powerful alternative to traditional military means to achieve
operational objectives. Major General Charles Dunlap, Jr., has famously
coined the term ―lawfare‖ to describe the strategy of so using—or misusing—law. Terrorist groups and their state sponsors have made explicit and
sometimes effective use of lawfare to achieve their operational objectives.
Under the Obama Administration, and especially the Bush Administration, the U.S. executive branch‘s response to law‘s potential as a tool
for advancing military objectives has thus far been predominantly defensive. This is unfortunate. If there are ways of accomplishing traditional military objectives using law, the United States should not only fight back hard
against terrorists‘ use of them but also vigorously look for ways to itself so
use law. First, lawfare is less deadly than traditional warfare. Second, if
some portion of the battle can take place in the courts rather than the battlefield, that should be to the U.S.‘s great advantage. While the United States
does have more sophisticated lethal weapons than those of its adversaries,
its advantage in sophisticated legal weapons is surely even greater. However, the U.S.‘s advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has thus far been
underutilized.
Part I of this article analyzes lawfare and its use by terrorists and
their state sponsors. Part II examines the U.S. executive branch‘s defensive
response to lawfare. Part III employs as a case study the uses thus far and
potential future uses of lawfare against Iran, which is both the leading state
sponsor of terrorism and the leading threat to the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. The remarkable impact of the limited deployment of lawfare against
Iran to date indicates that some types of lawfare, deployed systematically
and effectively, may be able to save U.S. and foreign lives by significantly
advancing U.S. national security objectives that would otherwise require
kinetic warfare.1 Part IV notes that the successes of lawfare-style sanctions
vis à vis Iran call into question the accuracy of the dominant paradigm in
the scholarly literature regarding sanctions, which derides sanctions as ineffective in a globalized economy. Part IV concludes by considering lessons

1

Kinetic warfare is warfare that involves traditional weapons such as guns and bombs.
See, e.g., Ruth Walker, Other Ways Than By (Kinetic) Warfare, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/The-Home-Forum/2009/0123/p18s01hfes.html.
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learned and how the United States could more effectively use some types of
lawfare as a tool for promoting its national security.
I. LAWFARE AND ITS USE BY TERRORISTS AND THEIR STATE SPONSORS
In his series of influential articles on ―lawfare,‖ Major General
Charles Dunlap, Jr., used the term lawfare to describe the ―strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve an operational objective.‖2 The concept of lawfare is extremely
useful both for describing a particular set of distinct activities undertaken by
enemies of the United States (and its allies), principally terrorists and their
state sponsors, and for describing a particular set of distinct activities that
could be undertaken by the United States to accomplish its national security
objectives vis à vis its enemies.
Lawfare, as practiced by enemies of the U.S., has thus far predominantly taken two interrelated forms: (1) battlefield tactics designed to gain
advantage from the greater allegiance of the United States and its allies to
international law—especially the international law of armed conflict—and
its processes; and (2) the use—or misuse—of legal forums to achieve operational objectives traditionally achieved by military means.
A.

Battlefield Tactics Designed to Gain Advantage from the Other
Side’s Greater Allegiance to International Law

In his first major article on lawfare, published in 2001, Dunlap focused primarily on battlefield tactics designed to gain advantage from the
U.S.‘ greater allegiance to international law and its processes, and especially
the international law of armed conflict.3 He suggested that these tactics are
2
Charles Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT‘L AFF. 146, 146 (2008).
Other commentators have offered various narrower definitions. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr.
and Lee Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, at A11 (―The term ‗lawfare‘ describes
the growing use of international law claims, usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool of
war.‖); Kenneth Anderson, ‗Lawfare’ as Illegal Behavioral Counters to Superior Military
Forces, and the Limits of Technological Responses to It, KENNETH ANDERSON‘S L. OF WAR
AND JUST WAR THEORY Blog (May 5, 2008, 10:09 AM), http://kennethandersonlawofwar.
blogspot.com/2008/05/as-illegal-behavioral-counters-to.html (―One way to define ‗lawfare,‘
in fact, is systematic behavioral violations of the rules of war, violations of law undertaken
and planned through advance study of the laws of war in order to predict how law-abiding
military forces will behave and exploit their compliance; and where such violations are intended as a behavioral counter to superior military forces, including superior, yet lawcompliant, technology and weapons systems.‖).
3
See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian
Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. of
Gov‘t, Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/
cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf [hereinafter Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions].
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designed to accomplish two main goals: (1) the tactical goal of causing U.S.
armed forces to fight with one hand tied behind their back and (2) the strategic goal of destroying the American public‘s will to fight by making it
appear that the United States is waging war in violation of the law of armed
conflict.4 The same enemy act can accomplish both goals. Dunlap gave as
an example Taliban placement of military assets in or around ―noncombatant facilities such as religious structures and NGO [non-governmental organization] compounds in the hopes of either deterring attacks or, if attacks
do take place, producing collateral damage media events that serve their
cause.‖5 Similar tactics have been adopted by other armed forces, including
Saddam Hussein‘s Iraqi military6 and Hamas, which, as Laurie Blank notes,
has fired from schools and residential areas ―‗in the hope that nearby civilians would deter Israel from responding‘.‖7
It has been said by some at this conference that insurgent activities
such as firing from amongst civilians are simply a violation of the law of
war, and do not merit their own attention, separate from that, as examples of
one type of lawfare—the deliberate attempt to gain advantage from the other side‘s greater allegiance to international law and its processes. I disagree.
I find particularly cynical, troubling, corrosive of international law, and
worthy of separate study, efforts to deliberately try to gain advantage from
one side‘s greater allegiance to international law and its processes. This is a
type of lawfare that the United States should strongly oppose and definitely
not seek to replicate.

4

Id. at 11–13.
Id. at 13.
6
See Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield, Enemy
Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 56
A.F. L. REV. 1, 43–51 (2005); Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and
Civilian Casualties in Iraq 74-76 (2003); Senior Def. Official, U.S. Dep‘t of Def., Briefing
on Use of Human Shields in Iraq (Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030226-dod01.htm (―The Iraqis have regularly placed air
defense missile systems and associated equipment in and around civilian areas, including
parks, mosques, hospitals, hotels, crowded shopping districts, and even in cemeteries. They
have positioned rocket launchers next to soccer stadiums that are in active use, and they‘ve
parked operational surface-to-air missile systems in civilian industrial areas. This is a wellorganized, centrally managed effort, and its objectives are patently clear: preserve Iraq‘s
military capabilities at any price, even though it means placing innocent civilians and Iraq‘s
cultural and religious heritage at risk, all in violation of the fundamental principle that civilians and civilian objects must be protected in wartime.‖).
7
Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts But Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza and
Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 279, 290 (2011)(citing Goldstone report quote of interview with three Palestinian militants).
5
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Use—Or Misuse—of Legal Forums to Achieve Operational Objectives Traditionally Achieved by Military Means

Briefly in Dunlap‘s seminal 2001 article,8 and especially since, the
concept of lawfare has also been used, in particular by other commentators,
to describe efforts to use—or misuse—legal forums to advance operational
objectives traditionally achieved by military means.9 This latter type of lawfare was famously referred to in the Pentagon‘s March 2005 National Defense Strategy for the United States of America, which stated: ―Our strength
as a nation will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of
the weak, focusing on international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.‖10
Dunlap provides several examples of such efforts to manipulate legal forums to advance operational objectives traditionally achieved by military means. For instance, in Colombia, the FARC rebels discovered that one
way of getting rid of a particularly effective government military commander is to accuse that commander of human rights violations. 11 This is effective because under Colombian law, the commander must then be relieved of
command and is not eligible for military defense counsel, thus requiring
him to spend personal funds to hire defense counsel.12
The manipulation of legal forums to advance military objectives is
also an explicit tactic of Hezbollah and Hamas. Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Nasrallah has spoken as follows of manipulating legal forums to
advance his military objective of defeating Israel: ―We have to sue the
Israeli leaders anywhere possible in the world. Suing Israel for its crimes
will render Israeli leaders beleaguered and perplexed.‖13
Similarly, a Hamas leader recently discussed the group‘s ―policy‖
of seeking to have senior Israeli leaders arrested whenever they visit European countries.14 The Times of London reported that ―Hamas says that it
initiated‖ a British arrest warrant issued against Tzipi Livni, who served as
8

Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 3, at 36.
See Rivkin and Casey, supra note 2; Jeremy Rabkin, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., July 13,
2004, at A14.
10
U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 5 (2005).
11
Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 3, at 36.
12
Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 3, at 36; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The
Law of Armed Conflict, AFA Policy Forum, (Sept. 13, 2005), http://www.afa.org/media/
scripts/Dunlap_conf2005.asp.
13
Mohamad Shmaysani, Sayyed Nasrallah: Unite to Back Turkey, Egypt; Take Part in
Freedom Flotilla 2, AL MANAR (June 4, 2010), http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/News
Details.aspx?id=140626&language=ar (Al Manar is a Lebanese media outlet affiliated with
Hezbollah).
14
James Hider, Hamas Using English Law to Demand Arrest of Israeli Leaders for War
Crimes, TIMES OF LONDON (Dec. 21, 2009).
9
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Foreign Minister of Israel during the 2008 war in Gaza.15 According to the
Times, in the United Kingdom ―the campaign by Hamas takes advantage of
an aspect of law in England and Wales that allows anyone to apply for an
arrest warrant for alleged war crimes without the need for a prosecuting
lawyer.‖16 As a result of the warrant, Livni, who had been scheduled to address a meeting in London, was forced to cancel her visit.17
Similar warrant efforts have led other Israeli leaders to cancel other
visits to the U.K.18 Such efforts to manipulate legal forums to transform
Israel into a pariah state seem designed to contribute to the Hezbollah and
Hamas objectives of destroying Israel, including by distracting Israel‘s
leaders from their duties; contributing to Israel‘s delegitimization and demoralization; and reducing Israel‘s ability to conduct diplomatic relations and
communicate effectively with foreign audiences.
II. THE U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH‘S DEFENSIVE RESPONSE TO LAWFARE
Under the Obama Administration, and especially the Bush Administration, the U.S. executive branch‘s response to law‘s potential as a tool
for advancing military objectives has thus far been predominantly defensive. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense during the George W. Bush
Administration, saw lawfare in ―personal terms,‖ expecting to be ―at the top
of the target list,‖ according to Jack Goldsmith, who served during that administration as Special Counsel at the Department of Defense and then Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel.19
Rumsfeld‘s concern increased after a group of Iraqis brought universal jurisdiction criminal complaints against him and General Tommy
Franks in a Belgian court in the spring of 2003.20 The complaints centered
on war crimes alleged to have been committed during the invasion of Iraq.21
After Rumsfeld threatened to move NATO headquarters out of Belgium,
Belgium changed its universal jurisdiction law and blocked the prosecutions
of Rumsfeld and Franks.22 However, Rumsfeld worried about both the universal jurisdiction laws that remained on the books elsewhere in Europe and
international tribunals.23 Rumsfeld‘s concern about the latter was heigh15

Id.
Id.; see also Richard Ford, Anyone Can Apply for a Warrant Over Allegations of a
Serious Offence, TIMES OF LONDON (Dec. 21, 2009).
17
Soeren Kern, New “War Crimes” Lawfare, HUDSON NEW YORK, Aug. 4, 2010,
http://www.hudson-ny.org/1456/new-war-crimes-lawfare.
18
Id.
19
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 59 (2007).
20
Id. at 60–61.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 61.
23
Id.
16
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tened by a narrowly averted move by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia to prosecute NATO officials for bombing a Serbian
television station and other alleged war crimes during the 1999 Kosovo
campaign.24
As was discussed in detail at the Lawfare! symposium, some associated with the Bush Administration used the term ―lawfare‖ to derogatorily
describe legal work by a human rights non-governmental organization
(NGO) and several American attorneys defending Guantanamo detainees
and other defendants in the war on terror.25 The unsubstantiated implication
was that the NGO and attorneys were trying to use law to advance a traditional military objective; for example, the defeat of the United States and its
allies.26
The Bush Administration placed considerable weight in its legal
policy decisions on defending the United States from lawfare. For example,
the Administration opposed U.S. participation in the International Criminal
Court (ICC) out of fear that those hostile to the United States might bring
about ICC trials of American leaders or soldiers.27 The Administration also
argued for its Guantánamo military tribunals in part on the grounds that
standard criminal trials of al-Qaeda operatives could be manipulated by
defense counsel to put prosecutors to a choice between revealing sensitive
U.S. intelligence sources and methods or letting terrorists go free.28 As of
January 2011, nearly two years into the Obama Administration, the United
States still has not joined the ICC, and the Obama Administration has itself
decided to use military commissions in certain circumstances.29

24

Id.
See, e.g., Jeff Breinholt, J’Accuse: Lawfare Lawyers Storming the Courts, FAMILY
SECURITY MATTERS, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.fsmarchives.org/article.php?id=1386307; Jeff
Breinholt, Is Lawfare Being Abused by American Lawyers?, FINDLAW‘S WRIT, Mar. 9, 2007,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20070309_breinholt.html.
26
It is worth nothing that the implication may not be as far off the mark in the specific
case of American attorney Lynne Stewart, who was convicted in 2005 by a U.S. federal
district court of ―assisting terrorism by smuggling information from an imprisoned client to
violent followers in Egypt.‖ John Eligon, Heftier Term for Lawyer in Terrorism Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A22.
27
Phillip Carter, Legal Combat: Are Enemies Waging War in Our Courts?, SLATE (Apr. 4,
2005, 5:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2116169/; Goldsmith, supra note 19, at 61–63.
28
Goldsmith, supra note 19, at 109; Frederic L. Borch, III, Why Military Commissions Are
the Proper Forum and Why Terrorists Will Have “Full and Fair” Trials: A Rebuttal to Military Commissions: Trying American Justice, THE ARMY LAWYER 10 (2003).
29
Charlie Savage, Judge Delays Resumption of Guantanamo Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/us/15gitmo.html# (―Mr. Obama had been a critic
during the presidential campaign of Mr. Bush‘s use of military commissions. But his administration eventually decided that the tribunals were necessary if certain detainees were to
receive trials, because they offered greater flexibility than civilian courts in the admission of
certain kinds of evidence, like hearsay and materials gathered under battlefield conditions.‖).
25
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In addition, the U.S. military has, at least in part in response to lawfare, greatly restricted its targeting (on occasion restricting itself beyond the
requirements of international law) in order to avoid accusations of disproportionate collateral damage to civilians.30 Dunlap provides an example of
how reports about NATO airstrikes allegedly causing civilian casualties
were responded to by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan.31 ISAF responded to reports of such deaths by proclaiming
that NATO ―would not fire on positions if it knew there were civilians nearby.‖32 A NATO spokesman emphasized that ―if there is the likelihood of
even one civilian casualty, [NATO] will not strike, not even if we think
Osama bin Laden is down there.‖33 This goes beyond the requirements of
international law and also encourages enemy forces to surround themselves
with innocents so as to immunize themselves from attack. 34 As Dunlap so
eloquently puts it, NATO‘s creation of restrictions beyond what is required
by the law of armed conflict
creates for its adversary a substitute for conventional military weaponry. . . for the Taliban to survive it is not necessary for them to
build conventional air defenses; rather, just by operating amidst civilians they enjoy a legal sanctuary . . . that is as secure as any fortress bristling with anti-aircraft guns.35
So the U.S. executive branch‘s response to lawfare—law as a tool
for advancing operational objectives traditionally achieved by military
means—has been predominantly defensive, a response adopted originally
by the Bush Administration but which still strongly influences the U.S. ap30

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Visiting Professor, Duke University School of Law and Associate Director, Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security, Presented at Case Western
University School of Law Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War Crimes Research
Symposium, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia? (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.
au.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/2010/0520/0520Articles/Dunlap0520.pdf (―By creating restrictions beyond what the law of armed conflict would require, NATO‘s pronouncements encourage the Taliban to shield themselves from air attack by violating the law of armed conflict by embedding themselves among civilians.‖).
31
See id. (discussing comments from Maj. John Thomas, spokesman for NATO‘s International Security Assistance Force).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Op-Ed., Lawfare Amid Warfare, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007,
at A17, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/03/lawfare-amidwarfare/?page=1 (―Establishing a paradigm of "zero tolerance" for casualties may well come
back to haunt us in yet another way. Specifically, it encourages the enemy to do exactly what
we do not want them to do: surround themselves with innocent civilians so as to virtually
immunize themselves from attack. It creates a sanctuary that the bad guys are not entitled to
enjoy, and sends them exactly the wrong message.‖).
35
Dunlap, supra note 30.
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proach to the ICC and other issues. This is unfortunate, as the U.S. government could more effectively advance its national security objectives by
making more offensive use of lawfare.
III. HOW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN BETTER USE LAWFARE AS A TOOL
FOR PROMOTING NATIONAL SECURITY
The U.S. government‘s response to lawfare should not simply be a
defensive crouch. If there are ways of accomplishing traditionally military
objectives using law, the United States should not only fight back hard
against others‘ use of them but also vigorously look for ways to itself so use
law. As Phillip Carter so eloquently put it: ―[W]e have every reason to embrace lawfare, for it is vastly preferable to the bloody, expensive, and destructive forms of warfare that ravaged the world in the 20 th century.‖36
First, lawfare has the clear advantage of being less deadly to both combatants and bystanders than is conventional warfare.37 As Carter wryly puts it,
he ―would far prefer to have motions and discovery requests fired at [him]
than incoming mortar or rocket-propelled grenade fire.‖38 Second, if some
part of the fight is to take place not in the battlefields but rather the courts,
that should be to U.S. society‘s great advantage. While the United States
does have more sophisticated lethal weapons than its adversaries, its advantage in sophisticated legal weapons is surely even greater. Thus far, the U.S.
advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has been underutilized in the war
on terror. The U.S. government, and perhaps even concerned U.S. attorneys
in the private sector, could be doing far more to use law—both existing law
and potential changes to law—as part of the fight against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Iranian regime, and others who seek to engage in terrorist acts
against the United States and/or acquire weapons of mass destruction.
In order to concretely analyze how the United States could more effectively use lawfare as a tool for promoting its national security, the remaining sections of this article employ as a case study the uses thus far and
potential future uses of lawfare against Iran, which is both the leading state
sponsor of terrorism39 and the leading threat to the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. The article will analyze, and draw more broadly applicable lessons
from, four existing examples of where law is already being used deliberate36

Phillip Carter, Legal Combat: Are Enemies Waging War in Our Courts?, SLATE (Apr. 4,
2005, 5:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2116169/.
37
Id. (―[L]awfare rarely generates the collateral damage of conventional warfare. In recent
war zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq, the cumulative civilian death toll stretches
into the hundreds of thousands.‖).
38
Id.
39
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2009 (2009), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm
(―Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism.‖).
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ly, systematically, and creatively to achieve operational objectives against
Iran.
A.

The Iranian Threat to International Peace and Security

Iran‘s nuclear weapons program, state sponsorship of terrorism, and
human rights abuses make it a preeminent threat to international peace and
security. In pursuing its dangerous agenda, the Iranian government egregiously violates international law. For example, Iran continues to violate
U.N. Security Council resolutions ordering Iran to suspend its nuclear
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water related activities.40 In a series of
periodic reports, most recently on November 23, 2010, the Director General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency has determined again and again
that ―contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the
Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities‖
and has ―continued‖ with ―heavy water related activities.‖41
At the same time, Iran has chosen to violate numerous other international legal obligations. Iran‘s brutal response to postelection protests
contravened its human rights obligations under international law, including
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.42 Iran has also continued its destabilizing support for terrorist groups across the Middle East,
including by providing them with arms in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1747.43
40
S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (2006) (Dec. 27, 2006); see also S.C. Res.
1747, ¶¶ 12–13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (2007) (Mar. 24, 2007) (reaffirming resolution
1737); S.C. Res. 1803, ¶¶ 1, 14, 18–19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (2008) (Mar. 3, 2008) (reaffirming resolutions 1737 and 1747); S.C. Res. 1929, ¶¶ 1–2, 36–37, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929
(2010) (June 9, 2010) (affirming Iran‘s non-compliance with resolutions 1737, 1747, and
1803 and reaffirming resolution 1737).
41
Int‘l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Director General, Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 9, IAEA Doc. GOV/2010/62 (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-62.pdf. See also, e.g., Int‘l Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA] Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 11,
IAEA Doc. GOV/2010/46 (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2010/gov2010-46.pdf (identical language).
42
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52–60 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at
www2.ohchr.org/English/law/ccpr.htm; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95–20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
43
For example, an Iranian ship carrying weapons from Iran to Yemeni rebels, which was
seized by the Yemeni government on October 26, 2009, violated UN Security Council Resolution 1747, which orders that ―Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly
from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related
materiel.‖ S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 41, ¶ 5. A second ship, carrying 500 tons of weapons
from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was seized by the Israeli navy on November 3,

File: Kittrie 2

2010]
B.

Created on: 1/13/2011 7:36:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:08:00 PM

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

403

Overview of U.S. and International Responses to Iran

What is the range of responses available to the United States and to
the international community? A U.S. President‘s five key tools for altering
the behavior of a foreign country can be alliteratively characterized as: (1)
speaking (statements and negotiations); (2) sweeteners (incentives); (3)
sanctions (economic and diplomatic restrictions); (4) sabotage and (5) soldiers (military action). In the case of Iran, speaking and sweeteners have
been tried and failed,44 and soldiers are a very problematic option.
The United States and its allies are reportedly focusing their efforts
against Iran‘s nuclear program on sanctions and covert sabotage (including,
for example, the Stuxnet computer virus).45 The combination of sanctions
and sabotage seems, as of early January 2011, to be succeeding in significantly slowing Iran‘s nuclear program.46 On January 10, 2011, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton stated: ―The most recent analysis is that the sanctions
have been working. They have made it much more difficult for Iran to pur-

2009, violated Resolution 1747 as well as Resolution 1701, which ordered all States to ―prevent . . . the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel
of all types.‖ See id.; S.C. Res. 1701, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (2006) (Aug. 11, 2006).
44
Seven days after his inauguration, President Barack Obama declared that ―if countries
like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.‖ Nazila
Fathi & Alan Cowell, After Obama Overture, Iran’s Leader Seeks U.S. Apology, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2009, at A8. Over the rest of 2009, the Obama administration followed up on the
January 27, 2009 declaration with numerous friendly gestures to the Iranian regime. The
United States used terminology suggesting it was no longer seeking regime change, emphasized its disinterest in using military force against Iran‘s nuclear program, for a year stopped
seeking significantly stronger sanctions against Iran, and offered Iran a very generous deal
relating to its Tehran Research Reactor. However, the Iranian regime responded to Obama‘s
outstretched hand with a clenched fist. As President Obama stated in his speech of March 20,
2010 to the Iranian people on the occasion of Nowruz, the Iranian new-year: ―You have
refused good faith proposals from the international community . . . . Faced with an extended
hand, Iran‘s leaders have shown only a clenched fist.‖ THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE
PRESS SECRETARY, REMARKS OF PRESIDENT OBAMA MARKING NOWRUZ (2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-marking-nowruz; see
also Videotaped Remarks on the Observance of Nowruz, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.
201000190 (Mar. 20, 2010), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2010/DCPD201000190.pdf.
45
David Ignatius, Buying Time with Iran, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2011, at A17 (―Stuxnet was
just one of what appeared to have been a series of efforts to disrupt the supply chain of the
Iranian nuclear program.‖); Isabel Kershner, Israeli Ex-Spy Predicts Delay for Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at A8 (―The United States also has a covert program to undermine Iran‘s nuclear program.‖).
46
See, e.g., Jay Solomon & Charles Levinson, Sanctions Slow Iran’s Warhead Capability,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8-9, 2011, at A1; Ignatius, supra note 45, at A17 (―The Obama Administration has concluded that Iran‘s nuclear program has been slowed by a combination of sanctions, sabotage and Iran‘s own technical troubles.‖).
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sue its nuclear ambitions.‖47 As Washington Post Associate Editor David
Ignatius wrote about U.S. policy towards Iran in a column in early January
2011, ―What‘s increasingly clear is that low-key weapons—covert sabotage
and economic sanctions—are accomplishing many of the benefits of military action, without the costs.‖48
While Stuxnet and other efforts to sabotage Iran‘s nuclear program
are clearly having a significant impact, and undoubtedly raise important
questions in the cyberlaw and other relevant legal arenas, they are not examples of using law as a tool to achieve an operational objective. In contrast, sanctions are a form of lawfare, as Paul Williams noted at the Lawfare! symposium, and as Gen. Charles Dunlap discusses in the section titled
―Lawfare as an American Weapon‖ of his article for this symposium. 49 Gen.
Dunlap provides several examples of when ―actions that could be characterized as lawfare have been carried out by the United States—and properly
so.‖50 In doing so, he offers the following outstanding example of the potential power of the sanctions type of lawfare:
Legal ‗weaponry‘ can have effects utterly indistinguishable from
those produced by their kinetic analogs. During the 2003 invasion,
for example, the Iraqi air force found itself hobbled by a legal device—sanctions—as effectively as by any outcome from traditional
aerial combat. By preventing the acquisition of new aircraft, as well
as spare parts for the existing fleet, Iraqi airpower was so debilitated
that not a single aircraft rose in opposition to the coalition air armada.51
The sanctions imposed on Iran in recent years—through U.N. Security Council resolutions binding under international law and through
changes to the domestic laws of the U.S., European Union, and others—
have been a particularly salient, deliberate, and, in many cases, creative
form of lawfare. The sanctions use law as a substitute for traditional military
means to advance an operational objective—in this case, halting Iran‘s illicit
nuclear program.52

47

Jay Solomon, Clinton Says Curbs Slow Iran Program, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2001, at

A10.
48

Ignatius, supra note 45, at A17.
Dunlap, supra note 30.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 40 (the Security Council, in the resolution‘s
preamble, notes that the resolution is motivated in part by a determination ―to constrain
Iran‘s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes‖); Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-195, § 2 (10) (2010)(finding that ―economic sanctions to prevent Iran from
49
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What are the principal means by which sanctions—economic and
other restrictions imposed through changes to international and domestic
law—can advance their operational objective? Sanctions can have any or all
of several useful impacts on the target, including especially (1) coercing the
target (in this case Iran) into halting its illegal behavior, if the costs of the
behavior (in this case proceeding with the nuclear program or supporting
terrorism) are increased sufficiently to outweigh the benefits to the regime
of proceeding with the behavior; and (2) constraining the target from engaging in illegal behavior, if the sanctions materially reduce the target‘s supply
of assets necessary to engage in the behavior.53 The U.S. government‘s current sanctions on Iran are designed to both coerce and constrain Iran.54
Recent history shows that strong sanctions, effectively implemented, can help stop illegal nuclear weapons programs and terrorism. For
example, robust sanctions helped induce Libya to forsake terrorism and
verifiably relinquish its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.55 In exchange for the lifting of sanctions imposed by the United Nations and United States, Libya halted its support for terrorism, paid $2.7
billion to the families of the Pan Am flight 103 bombing victims, and allowed a team of British and U.S. government experts to enter Libya and
dismantle its weapons of mass destruction infrastructure.56

developing nuclear weapons, are necessary to protect the essential security interests of the
United States.‖).
53
Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of the goals potentially served by the
imposition of sanctions in the international arena may wish to refer to Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Losing its Deterrence Capacity
and How to Restore It, 28 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 337, 354–61 (2007).
54
Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treasury, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies by Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
Stuart Levey (Sept. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Levey remarks], available at http://www.ustreas.
gov/press/releases/tg862.htm (Levey emphasizes two desired impacts of the Obama Administration‘s tightening sanctions on Iran. One is ―to sharpen the choice for Iran‘s leaders between integration with the international community, predicated on fulfilling their international obligations, and the hardship of further isolation.‖ Levey explains that ―[b]y dramatically
isolating Iran financially and commercially and by capitalizing on Iran‘s existing vulnerabilities, we can impact Iran‘s calculations‖ so as to ―create crucial leverage for our diplomacy.‖
Another desired impact is to ―make it harder for Iran to pursue international procurement for
its nuclear and military programs.‖).
55
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & BARBARA
OEGG, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 12–13 (3d ed. 2007) (―[T]he surprise decision
by Libyan President Muammar Gadhafi in 2003 to renounce weapons of mass destruction
was partly influenced by his desire to end the decade-old U.S. sanctions and to gain access to
American oil field technology and know-how.‖).
56
The sanctions on Libya both contained Qaddafi‘s ability to develop weapons of mass
destruction and ultimately coerced him, including by grinding down Libya‘s oil industry and
causing economic problems so severe they threatened his grip on Libya. See Kittrie, supra
note 53, at 406–14.
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Unfortunately, the U.N. Security Council—thanks to Russian and
Chinese obstructionism—has thus far imposed relatively weak sanctions on
Iran for its proliferant activities.57 For example, the sanctions thus far imposed by the Security Council on Iran are significantly weaker than the
sanctions imposed by the Council in response to many lesser threats to international peace and security—including on Liberia during its 2003 civil
war, Sierra Leone in response to its 1997 military coup, Yugoslavia during
the Bosnia crisis, Haiti in response to its 1991 military coup, Libya in response to its support for terrorism, and Iraq in response to its invasion of
Kuwait and weapons of mass destruction programs.58
Due to its ideology, the value to the Iranian regime of engaging in
nuclear proliferation is particularly high.59 However, the price the international community has exacted from the Iranian regime for its violations has
thus far been remarkably low. Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747,
1803, and 1929 are, by themselves, too weak to coerce Iran into compliance, halt Iran‘s ability to advance its nuclear weapons program, or deter
other states from following Iran‘s lead and developing their own nuclear
weapons program. This is unfortunate because Iran‘s heavy dependence on
foreign trade leaves it highly vulnerable to strong economic sanctions.60
Concerned that U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iran are insufficiently impactful, and faced with the drawbacks of a U.S. military option,
American opponents of Iran‘s nuclear weapons program are creatively using
law in four key ways to step up the pressure on Iran to comply with international law and cease its enrichment and other sensitive nuclear activities: (1)
state and local actions including pension divestment; (2) legal pressure on
foreign banks doing business with Iran; (3) legal pressure on foreign energy
companies supplying refined petroleum to Iran; and (4) litigation strategies.

57
See id. at 383–84, 389 (discussing Russian and Chinese blocking of strong Security
Council sanctions on Iran).
58
See Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by Impunity: The History and Consequences of Failure
to Enforce Iranian Violations of International Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 519, 547–48
(2007) (comparing the strength of these sanctions imposed by the Security Council).
59
See id. at 543–44 (―Iranian leadership is . . . motivated by a religious conviction that
exalts martyrdom and suffering. In comparison with a purely economic calculation, the Iranian regime‘s ideology causes it to ascribe greater cost to complying with the sender‘s demand to shut down the nuclear weapons program and lesser cost to any suffering that may be
imposed by sanctions.‖).
60
See Kittrie, supra note 58, at 536–537 (―Iran‘s heavy dependence on oil export revenue
and other foreign trade leaves it highly vulnerable to economic sanctions.‖); see also Kittrie,
Using Stronger Sanctions to Increase Negotiating Leverage with Iran, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY (Dec. 2009), at 18–21, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/3982.
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State and local actions including pension divestment

As of 2004, U.S. state and local pension funds reportedly had some
$188 billion invested in foreign companies doing business with state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran.61 State and local pension fund divestment
from such companies was seen by its proponents as having the potential to
contribute significantly to discouraging these and other foreign companies
from investing in, or otherwise doing business with, these state sponsors of
terrorism.62 In addition, the threatened withdrawal from such companies of
state and local pension fund investment was seen as providing these companies with a strong incentive to withdraw from business they were already
doing with the state sponsors of terrorism.63 At least twenty-seven states and
the District of Columbia have divested pension funds from companies doing
business with Sudan, as have at least twenty-two cities.64 In addition, at
least nineteen states and the District of Columbia have divested pension
funds from companies investing in Iran‘s energy sector.65 In order to facilitate such divestment relating to Sudan, Congress passed, and President Bush
signed into law in 2007, the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act,
which clarifies that certain types of state and local divestment from companies doing business with Sudan are not preempted.66 Similarly, on July 1,
2010, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, which clarifies that certain
types of state and local divestment from companies doing business with Iran
are not preempted.67
Iran‘s opponents in the United States have also used state and local
law in other ways to put pressure on Iran. For example, in 2007, when Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty discovered that an Indian company, Essar,
was seeking to both invest some $1.6 billion in Minnesota and invest over

61

See Ctr. for Sec. Policy, The Terrorism Investments of the 50 States,
DIVESTTERROR.ORG, 2 (Aug. 12, 2004), http://merln.ndu.edu/merln/mipal/reports/Divest
Terror_Report.pdf (―The total estimated value of the stock of some 400 companies doing
business in terrorist sponsoring states held by America‘s leading public pension systems is
approximately $188 billion.‖).
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
See generally Perry S. Bechky, The Politics of Divestment, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Tomer Broude ed., forthcoming 2010).
65
Id.; State-by-State Update on Iran Divestment Legislation (updated August 2010), The
Israel Project, http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=hsJPK0PIJpH
&b=689705&ct=8641297 .
66
Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat.
2516.
67
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1313.
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$5 billion in building a refinery in Iran, he put Essar to a choice. 68 Pawlenty
threatened to block state infrastructure subsidies and perhaps even construction permits for the Minnesota purchase unless Essar withdrew from the
Iranian investment.69 Essar promptly withdrew from the Iranian investment.70
In 2009, activists in Los Angeles, California put pressure on Siemens, which sold communications monitoring and other equipment to the
Iranian government, by opposing Siemens‘ efforts to supply rail cars to the
Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority.71 In January 2010,
Siemens announced that it would forgo new business with Iran.72 Although
the Siemens decision to forgo new business with Iran was not as clearly tied
to U.S. state or local pressures as was Essar‘s decision, the rail car contract
incident provides another interesting example of how lawfare can be used at
the state or local level.
2.

Legal pressure on foreign banks doing business with Iran73

The U.S. Department of the Treasury has convinced more than
eighty banks around the world, including most of the world‘s top financial
institutions,74 to cease some or all of their business with Iran.75 The tactics
Treasury is using were designed and first implemented under the George W.

68

See Larry Oakes, Essar Drops Plan with Iran: Steel Mill on Range is a Go,
STARTRIBUNE.COM (Oct. 31, 2007, 8:12 PM), http://www.startribune.com/business/11245
206.html (discussing Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty‘s statement that Essar‘s plans with
Iran, if carried out, would jeopardize Essar‘s subsidies to operate in Minnesota).
69
See id. (stating that Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty had threatened to pull construction permits if Essar followed through with its plans to build an oil refinery in Iran).
70
See Tim Pugmire, Pawlenty Says Essar Concerns are Resolved, MPR NEWS (Oct. 31,
2007, 5:16 PM), http://minnesota.priprod.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/10/31/
essargoesforward/.
71
See Eli Lake, Siemens Risks Losses Due to Iran Ties, WASH. TIMES (July 17, 2009, 4:45
AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/17/siemens-risks-losses-due-to-iranties/print/ (―One of the world‘s largest engineering firms, Siemens, could lose hundreds of
millions of dollars in sales to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA)
because it sold Iran equipment used to spy on dissidents.‖).
72
See Eli Lake, Siemens Decides to End Deals with Iran, WASH. TIMES. (Jan. 28, 2010,
5:01 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/17/siemens-risks-losses-due-toiran-ties/print/ (stating that Siemens announced that it ―would be forgoing new business with
Iran‖).
73
Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of the U.S. Treasury Department‘s
innovative campaign to persuade banks to curtail their business with Iran may wish to refer
to Orde F. Kittrie, New Sanctions for a New Century: Treasury’s Innovative use of Financial
Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT‘L L. 789, 789–822 (2009), from which this discussion is adapted.
74
See id. at 815 (―More than 80 banks around the world, including ‗most of the world‘s
top financial institutions,‘ have curtailed business with Iran.‖).
75
See Robin Wright, Stuart Levy’s War, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 2. 2008, at 31.
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Bush administration.76 However, the Obama Administration cast a strong
vote of confidence in them, including by taking the extraordinary decision
to retain in place Stuart Levey, the Bush-appointed Under Secretary of the
Treasury, who is principally known as the leading architect of these financial sanctions.77
What is Treasury‘s rationale for pressuring foreign banks to curtail
their business dealings with Iran? Iran utilizes the international financial
system to advance both its nuclear program and its state sponsorship of terrorism. In order to avoid suspicion and minimize the risk of detection, Iran‘s
state-owned banks and other entities use an array of deceptive practices
when using their global financial ties to advance Iran‘s nuclear program and
sponsorship of terrorism. For example, Iran uses front companies and intermediaries to surreptitiously obtain technology and materials for its nuclear and missile programs from countries that would prohibit such exports to
Iran.78 In addition, Iranian banks ask other financial institutions to remove
the Iranian banks‘ names when processing their transactions through the
international financial system.79 The goal is to allow Iranian banks to remain
undetected as they move money through the international financial system
to pay for the Iranian government‘s nuclear and missile related purchases
and to fund terrorism.80
What accounts for Treasury‘s considerable success in persuading
foreign banks to stop doing business with Iran? Treasury‘s principal innovation can be described as follows: Rather than asking, e.g., the Swiss government to order its banks to stop doing business with Iran, the Treasury has
gone directly to the Swiss banks. Treasury has found that its unprecedented
direct outreach to a country‘s key private financial institutions can yield
results much more quickly than does outreach to that same country‘s government, which can lack political will or the necessary authority, or may
face cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for exercising whatever relevant

76

See, e.g., id., Kittrie supra note 73, at 815.
Paul Richter, Obama Administration Keeps Bush Official Involved with Iran Sanctions,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/03/world/fg-usiran3 (―The
Obama administration has decided to retain the official who led the Bush administration‘s
effort to squeeze Iran with economic sanctions, providing an important clue on how it intends to approach the Islamic Republic.‖).
78
See Between Feckless and Reckless: U.S. Policy Options to Prevent a Nuclear Iran:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.. on the Middle East and South Asia, and the Subcomm..
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong.
28 (2008) [hereinafter Glaser statement] (statement of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Dep‘t of Treasury),
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41849.pdf.
79
Id.
80
Id.
77
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authorities it does have.81 Once some foreign private financial institutions
decide to halt business with entities or individuals of concern, the reputational risk for others not to follow is increased, and those who have halted
business with Iran often cooperate with the United States in putting pressure
on those who have not yet done so.82 Other banks within the jurisdiction
soon follow.83 Such private sector decisions can in turn make it more politically feasible for foreign governments to impose restrictions because some
or all of the major relevant companies in their jurisdiction have already forgone the business.84
What does the Treasury Department say to the foreign banks to get
them to stop doing business with Iran? Treasury officials remind the foreign
banks of the risks of doing even prima facie legal business with Iran. 85 The
banks with which the Treasury Department communicates are already aware
of the prosecutions the Treasury has brought against other banks. For example, in May 2004, the Federal Reserve fined UBS, Switzerland‘s largest
bank, $100 million for sending U.S. dollars to Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Yugoslavia, and intentionally hiding the transactions by submitting false
monthly reports to the Federal Reserve.86 In December 2005, ABN Amro
Bank NV, a Dutch firm, was fined $80 million by U.S. federal and state
financial regulators for actions including modification by its branch in Dubai of payment instructions on wire transfers, letters of credit, and checks
issued by Iran‘s Bank Melli and a Libyan bank in order to hide their involvement in the transactions and enable access to the U.S. banking system.87 As one former Treasury official put it in 2008, the Treasury Department‘s success in persuading foreign banks to curtail transactions with Iran

81
PRESS RELEASE, U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, REMARKS BY TREASURY SECRETARY
PAULSON ON TARGETED FINANCIAL MEASURES TO PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY (June
14, 2007) [hereinafter Paulson Remarks].
82
See id.
83
See id.
84
Glaser statement, supra note 78, at 35.
85
Id.
86
See UBS Fined $100 Million Over Trading of Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at
C17.
87
Paul Blustein, Dutch Bank Fined for Iran, Libya Transactions: $80 Million Levied for
Foreign Dealings, Money Laundering, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2005, 5:09 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/19/AR20051219018
04.html. Between December 2001 and April 2004, ABN AMRO‘s overseas branches removed or revised references to entities in which the governments of Libya and Iran had an
interest before forwarding wire transfers, letters of credit and U.S. dollar checks to ABN
AMRO branches in New York, NY and Chicago, IL. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL,
DEP‘T OF TREASURY, ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION (Jan. 3, 2006).
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was due in part to those banks‘ eagerness ―to avoid being the ‗next ABN
AMRO.‘‖88
Such prosecutions have continued under the Obama Administration.
In January 2009, Lloyds TSB Bank had to pay the U.S. government $350
million in fines and forfeiture as a result of a scheme in which Lloyds altered or ―stripped‖ wire-transfer information to hide the identities of Iranian
and Sudanese clients in order to deceive American financial institutions and
enable the clients to access the U.S. banking system. 89 The stripping of
wire-transfer information ―made it appear that the transactions originated at
Lloyds TSB Bank‖ in the U.K. rather than in the sanctioned countries.90
Most recently, in August 2010, Barclays PLC agreed to a $298 million settlement with U.S. prosecutors in connection with allegations that it violated
U.S. financial sanctions against countries including Iran.91
What has been the impact on Iran of the pressure on foreign banks
doing business with Iran? With most leading foreign banks curtailing their
business with Iran, Iranian companies and their business partners are finding
it difficult to arrange letters of credit, a central requirement for conducting
trade.92 Many companies doing business in or with Iran have been forced to
use smaller banks or go through intermediaries to arrange new letters of
credit, adding twenty to thirty percent to their costs.93
3.

Legal pressure on foreign energy companies supplying refined petroleum to Iran

Although Iranian oil wells produce far more petroleum (crude oil)
than Iran needs, Iran has relatively little capacity to refine that petroleum
(turn it into gasoline and diesel fuel).94 Remarkably for a country that is
investing so much in its nuclear programs, Iran has developed insufficient

88

Michael Jacobson, Sanctions Against Iran: A Promising Struggle, 31 WASH. Q. 69, 73
(2008).
89
Chad Bray, Lloyds TSB Settles with U.S. Officials, WALL ST. J., Jan 10, 2009, at B8.
90
Id.
91
Barclays Deal with U.S. Over Trade Sanctions is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010,
at B9.
92
See, e.g., Mark Trevelyan, More Companies Suspend Business with Iran, INT‘L HERALD
TRIB., Jan. 17, 2008, at 15 (quoting a senior German banking and finance consultant as stating that ―[i]t is today impossible more or less in Europe, with a couple of exceptions, to get a
letter of credit‖ for trade with Iran); No Letters of Credit, No Steel for Iranian Importers, say
Traders, METAL BULLETIN WEEKLY, Sept. 13, 2010, http://www.metalbulletin.co.uk/Article/
2675316/No-letters-of-credit-no-steel-for-Iranian-importers-say-traders.html.
93
Michael Jacobson, Putting the Squeeze on Iran, THE GUARDIAN ONLINE, July 22, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/22/iran.usforeignpolicy.
94
U.S. ENERGY & INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS, IRAN, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/
Iran/Oil.html.

File: Kittrie 2

412

Created on: 1/13/2011 7:36:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:08:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L.

[Vol. 43:393

capacity to refine the petroleum it pumps out of its own soil. As a result, in
2009, Iran imported some forty percent of the gasoline it was consuming.95
Iran had been purchasing nearly all of this gasoline from a handful
of foreign companies including Reliance Industries, an Indian firm.96 In
2008, nonproliferation law experts and members of Congress began looking
into how they might use law as a tool to pressure those companies to stop
doing business with Iran. Newsweek put it as follows:
An Arizona State University law professor and former State Department nuclear-nonproliferation official, Orde Kittrie, discovered
that Reliance had benefited from two U.S. Export-Import Bank loan
guarantees totaling $900 million. Members of Congress—led by
Democratic Rep. Brad Sherman of California and Republican Mark
Kirk of Illinois—demanded that the Ex-Im Bank cut off U.S. taxpayer assistance. After consulting with its high-priced Washington
lobbying firm, BGR, Reliance quietly passed the word to members
of Congress: it was halting all sales to Iran and would insist that its
trading partners do the same.97
The idea of squeezing Iran‘s gasoline supplies came to the attention
of Presidential candidate Barack Obama. In a June 2008 speech, thenSenator Obama said: ―We should work with Europe, Japan and the Gulf
states to find every avenue outside the United Nations to isolate the Iranian
regime—from cutting off loan guarantees and expanding financial sanctions, to banning the export of refined petroleum to Iran.‖98 Obama repeated
this sentiment during the presidential candidates‘ debate on Oct. 7, 2008:
―Iran right now imports gasoline . . . if we can prevent them from importing
the gasoline that they need . . . that starts changing their cost-benefit analysis. That starts putting the squeeze on them.‖99
After Iran‘s leadership rebuffed the Obama Administration‘s initial
attempts to engage Iran, Congress stepped up its efforts to place legal pressure on foreign energy companies supplying gasoline to Iran. In October
2009, both houses of Congress passed, and President Obama signed into
law, a prohibition on foreign companies selling to the U.S. government‘s
95

See, e.g., David E. Sanger, U.S. Weighs Iran Sanctions if Talks Are Rejected, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/03/world/middle
east/03nuke.html.
96
Orde F. Kittrie, How to Put the Squeeze on Iran, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2008, at A19,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122654026060023113.html.
97
Michael Hirsh, Obama’s Enforcer, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 2009, available at http://www.
newsweek.com/2009/12/11/obama-s-enforcer.html.
98
Transcript: Obama‘s Speech at AIPAC, National Public Radio, June 4, 2008, http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91150432.
99
Transcript: Second McCain, Obama Debate, CNN, Oct. 7, 2008, http://www.cnn.
com/2008/POLITICS/10/07/presidential.debate.transcript/.
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Strategic Petroleum Reserve if they are significantly involved in providing
refined petroleum to Iran.100
Then, on July 1, 2010, President Obama signed the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA).101 CISADA
principally mandates that the President impose sanctions (up to and including being barred from doing business in the U.S.) on any foreign company
that does various types of business with Iran‘s energy sector, including being involved with providing gasoline to Iran.102 CISADA notably also:

100



Requires each prospective contractor submitting a federal government bid to certify that the contractor or a person owned or
controlled by the contractor does not conduct any activity sanctionable under a key provision of CISADA103



Prohibits most remaining trade between Iran and the United
States104



Requires the Secretary of the Treasury to restrict the opening or
maintaining in the United States of a correspondent or payablethrough account by a foreign financial institution if that institution knowingly engages in various types of transactions with proscribed Iranian entities105



Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit any person
owned or controlled by a domestic financial institution from
knowingly engaging in a transaction with or benefiting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or its designated affiliates106



Prohibits U.S. executive agencies from entering into procurement
contracts with entities that have exported to Iran sensitive communications technology intended to be used to monitor or disrupt
the free flow of communications to, or restrict the speech of, the
people of Iran107



Increases criminal penalties for violations of various sanctions
provisions108



Clarifies that certain types of state and local divestment from
companies doing business with Iran are not preempted109

Tom Doggett, U.S. Lawmakers Vote to Punish Iran’s Fuel Suppliers, REUTERS, Oct. 1,
2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE59072H20091001; Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-85, § 313 (2009).
101
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-195 (2010).
102
Id.
103
Id. at § 102.
104
Id. at § 103(b).
105
Id. at § 104(c).
106
Id. at § 104(d).
107
Id. at § 106.
108
Id. at § 107.
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CISADA had a significant impact on gasoline exports to Iran even
before it was signed into law. Different companies stopped their varied
forms of involvement in providing gasoline to Iran at different stages in the
legislative process. For example, several companies stopped such business
once the bill passed both houses of Congress, another company stopped
once the conferenced legislation had been passed by both house of Congress, and another stopped conducting such business with Iran a few days
after President Obama signed the bill into law.110
Since CISADA‘s enactment in July 2010, the Obama Administration has, with foreign companies doing business with Iran‘s energy sector,
taken an analogous approach to the Treasury Department‘s unprecedented
direct outreach to key foreign private financial institutions. William Burns,
the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, put it as follows in his
December 1, 2010 statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs:
[W]e have used the powerful instrument provided by CISADA‘s
―special rule‖ to persuade major European and Asian firms, including Shell, Statoil, ENI, Total and INPEX, to terminate or take significant verifiable steps toward stopping potentially sanctionable activities in Iran and provide clear assurances that they would not undertake any sanctionable activities in Iran‘s energy sector in the future. According to reliable estimates, Iran may be losing as much as
$50-60 billion overall in potential energy investments, along with
the critical technology and know-how that comes with them. More
specifically, major international oil companies such as Shell, Statoil, ENI, Total and INPEX have decided not to undertake any new
activities in Iran. In addition, major fuel suppliers such as Vitol,
Shell, Reliance, IPG, Glencore, and Trafigura have announced that
109

Id. at § 202.
H.R. 2194, the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009, passed the House on
December 15, 2009. S. 2799, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009, passed the Senate on January 28, 2010. The Senate named its Iran
sanctions legislation conferees in early March 2010, and the House named its conferees in
late April 2010. The bill that emerged from conference, H.R. 2194, the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, passed both the House and the Senate on June 24, 2010. For a complete bill summary and status, see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02194:@@@X; Swiss energy traders Vitol, Glencore and Trafigura
publicly committed in March 2010 not to supply refined petroleum to Iran. Press Release,
U.S. Dep‘t of State, Companies Reducing Energy-related Business with Iran, Sept. 30, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/148458.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). The
French energy firm Total suspended gasoline shipments to Iran a few days after the conferenced legislation passed both houses of Congress. Paul Sampson, Iran Sanctions Open Way
for Chinese, INTERNATIONAL OIL DAILY, July 6, 2010. Lloyds of London announced on July
9, 2010 that it would not insure or reinsure petroleum shipments going into Iran. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of State, Companies Reducing Energy-related Business with Iran, Sept. 30,
2010, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/148458.htm.
110
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they will no longer sell refined petroleum products to Iran. Investment in Iran‘s upstream oil and gas sector has dropped dramatically,
forcing Iran to abandon liquefied natural gas projects for lack of
foreign investment and technical expertise.111
The ―special rule‖ contained in Section 102(g) of CISADA allows the President to on a case-by-case basis terminate, or not initiate, an investigation of
certain sanctionable activities under the Act if the President certifies that the
sanctionable entity has stopped the sanctionable activity or has ―taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity‖ and the President has
―received reliable assurances‖ that the sanctionable entity ―will not knowingly engage in [such activities] in the future.‖112
As discussed in section B.2 of this article, the Treasury Department
has in recent years persuaded foreign banks to stop doing business with Iran
by directly reaching out to those foreign banks and reminding them of the
risks of doing business with Iran, a risk exemplified by the steep fines levied against banks caught conducting illicit trade with Iran. In much the
same way, the State Department has in recent months persuaded foreign
energy companies to stop doing business with Iran by directly reaching out
to those foreign energy companies and advising them of the risks of doing
business with Iran, a risk exemplified by the CISADA sanctions (on companies doing business with Iran‘s energy sector), imposition of which can
be halted if the President receives reliable assurances that the company is
stopping such business with Iran‘s energy sector.113 In both cases, an implied or explicit threat of legal action pursuant to U.S. law, delivered to the
foreign company directly by U.S. officials, persuades the foreign company
to stop doing business with Iran, even though such business is not prohibited by the government of the country in which the foreign company is
headquartered.
As a result of this creative new form of lawfare, by October 2010,
each of the companies that had, two years before, been one of the top five
111

Hearing on Iran Sanctions, H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. (Dec. 1, 2010)
(written statement of William Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs),
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/bur120110.pdf.
112
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-195, § 102 (g) (2010).
113
See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, SPECIAL BRIEFING BY DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF STATE JAMES B. STEINBERG ON IRAN SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION (Sept.
30, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/148479.htm (―[F]our major international oil companies . . . have pledged to end their investments in Iran‘s energy sector . . . . These companies have provided assurances to us that they have stopped or are taking significant verifiable
steps to stop their activity in Iran and have provided assurances not to undertake new energyrelated activity in Iran that may be sanctionable. . . . as a result, the Secretary has decided to
use the Special Rule to avoid making a determination of sanctionability for these companies.‖).
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suppliers of gasoline to Iran, had dropped out of supplying gasoline to
Iran.114 The volume of gasoline imported by Iran in September 2010 was
reportedly as much as ninety percent less than what Iran imported in months
prior to the July 1, 2010 enactment of CISADA.115 Meanwhile, Iran‘s remaining gasoline suppliers have demanded higher premiums from Iran for
their willingness to risk U.S. penalties.116 By using lawfare, the United
States and its allies have managed to drastically reduce Iran‘s gasoline supplies without intercepting a single tanker or firing a single shot.
4.

Litigation strategies

The small cadre of private sector American attorneys who sue terrorist groups and the national governments which support them are an exceptional example of the use of lawfare in the war against terrorism. These
lawsuits have been extremely effective at times, including by bringing attention to the harm done by terrorists to Americans, using the American judicial system to find facts and make determinations as to the connections between countries such as Iran and terrorist attacks by groups such as Hezbollah, and putting financial pressure on terrorist-supporting states such as
Libya and Iran. For example, the lawsuit against Libya by the American
victims of Libya‘s bombing of Pan Am 103 was a vehicle by which Libya,
in August 2003, formally accepted responsibility for the bombing and paid
$2.7 billion in compensation to the victims‘ families.117

114

As of November 2008, the top five suppliers of gasoline to Iran were the Swiss firm
Vitol; the Swiss/Dutch firm Trafigura; the French firm Total; British Petroleum; and the
Indian firm Reliance Industries. Orde F. Kittrie, How to Put the Squeeze on Iran, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 13, 2008, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122654026060023113
.html. As of September 30, 2010, all five firms had stopped supplying gasoline to Iran. Press
Release, U.S. Dep‘t of State, Companies Reducing Energy-related Business with Iran, Sept.
30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/148458.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2010).
115
Reem Shamseddine & Luke Pachymuthu, Iran Fuel Imports Dive in Sept on SanctionsTrade, REUTERS, Sept. 24, 2010, http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFLDE68N
0ZF20100924 (last visited Nov. 27, 2010); Hearing on Iran Sanctions, H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. (Dec. 1, 2010) (oral testimony of William Burns, Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs)(stating that Iran‘s imports of refined petroleum products were
85 percent less in October 2010 than they were before July 2010).
116
See, e.g., US-led Sanctions Force Iran to Pay 25pc More for Gasoline, OIL & GAS
NEWS, Aug. 25, 2010; Samuel Ciszuk, Gasoline Import Premiums Rise Sharply Ahead of
Tighter Sanctions for Iran, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Apr. 5, 2010.
117
Kirit Radia & Maddy Sauer, Pan Am 103 Families Finally Compensated, ABC NEWS,
Oct. 31, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=6158491&page=1; See also Andrea
Koppel & Elise Labott, Libya Offers $2.7 billion Pan Am 103 Settlement, CNN, May 29,
2002, http://articles.cnn.com/2002-05-28/us/libya.lockerbie.settlement_1_libyan-offercommercial-sanctions-families-of-terror-victims?_s=PM:US.
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Iran is already a major target of these litigators as a result of terrorist acts including the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon.118
On October 23, 1983, a truck bomb struck a barracks housing U.S. Marine
participants in the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut, killing 241
Marines.119 In July 1987, Iran‘s then-Minister of Revolutionary Guards,
Mohsen Rafiqdoost, admitted that, ―both the TNT and the ideology which in
one blast sent to hell 400 officers, NCOs, and soldiers at the Marines headquarters were provided by Iran.‖120 There is a broad consensus among
Western experts that the planning of the attacks was supervised by Iran‘s
ambassador to Syria.121
In May 2003, in a case brought by relatives of some of the U.S. Marines who were killed, U.S. District Court Judge Royce C. Lamberth ruled
that the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible for the Marine barracks
attack.122 Lamberth based his conclusion on testimony by expert witnesses,
including a Hezbollah member who participated in the group that planned
the attack, and a declassified National Security Agency intercept of a September 1983 message sent from Iranian intelligence headquarters in Tehran
instructing the leader of Hezbollah (then known as Islamic Amal) to ―take a
spectacular action against the United States Marines.‖123 In 2007, Lamberth
ordered Iran to pay $2.7 billion in compensation to the victims‘ families. 124
In 2008, Lamberth‘s ruling served as the basis for the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York freezing $2 bilion in Iranian assets, held
in a Citibank account in New York City, at the behest of an attorney for the
victims‘ families.125
U.S. nonproliferation officials, these private sector attorneys, and
others are now considering how to use these civil litigation tactics, and the

118

Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of Iran‘s long state sponsorship of
terrorism and the international community‘s response may wish to refer to Orde F. Kittrie,
Emboldened by Impunity: The History and Consequences of Failure to Enforce Iranian
Violations of International Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 519 (2007), from which this discussion is adapted.
119
KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE PERSIAN PUZZLE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND
AMERICA 203 (2005).
120
Rafiqdoost‘s comments were published in the Tehran daily Resalat on July 20, 1987.
Ladan Boroumand & Roya Boroumand, Terror, Islam, and Democracy, 13 J. DEMOCRACY,
5, 19 n.18 (2002).
121
POLLACK, supra note 119, at 203.
122
Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 61 (D.C. 2003).
123
Id. at 54.
124
Judge Fines Iran $2.65B Over 1983 Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing, Sept. 8, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,296141,00.html.
125
Jay Solomon, U.S. Freezes $2 Billion in Iran Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2009, at A1.
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legal precedents they have set, to go after proliferators and their suppliers.126
Civil litigation options being considered include:

126



Lawsuits against foreign suppliers of dual-use items to Iran, for
example for aiding and abetting Iran‘s violations of international
nonproliferation law.127 One key question raised by this option is
who, including prospective victims of an illicit Weapons of Mass
Destruction program, could get standing to sue.128



Lawsuits based on the apparent personal involvement of senior
Iranian leaders in Hezbollah terrorist attacks. In 2008, the European Union designated the current Iranian defense minister,
Ahmed Vahidi, as ―a person linked to Iran‘s proliferationsensitive nuclear activities or Iran‘s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.‖129 Separately, an Argentinian judge has issued an arrest warrant for Vahidi, who is accused by Argentina of
having masterminded Hezbollah‘s 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Argentina, which killed eighty-five people.130 Despite assistance from Interpol,131 Argentina has not yet succeeded
in bringing Vahidi to justice. Perhaps civil litigation could be
more effective in reaching Vahidi and his assets.



Legal actions for intellectual property theft based on the fact that
Iran‘s nuclear program uses designs originally stolen from a European company, Urenco, by A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb.132

See Elaine M. Grossman, Proliferation Watchdogs Eye Litigation to Combat Illicit
Trafficking, Global Security Newswire, Oct. 30, 2009, at http://www.globalsecuritynewswire
.org/gsn/nw_20091030_3540.php.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Yaakov Lappin, Interpol: No warrant out for Iranian defense minister. Ahmad Vahidi
wanted by Argentina for allegedly masterminding the 1994 Buenos Aires Jewish center
bombing, Jerusalem Post, Sept. 8, 2009, at 5.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Global Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction, A.Q. Khan, http://www.globalsecurity.
org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm. It is worth noting that efforts to criminally prosecute
Khan for stealing the designs have thus far proven a failure. See, e.g., Chronology: A.Q.
Khan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/world/asia/16
chron-khan.html?_r=1 (noting that his conviction of nuclear espionage by a Dutch court was
―overturned based on an appeal that he had not received a proper summons‖ and that Dutch
prosecutors did not renew charges ―because of the impossibility of serving Khan a summons
given Pakistan security.‖) Khan‘s only punishment was a period of house arrest in Pakistan.
Joby Warrick, Nuclear Scientist A.Q. Khan is Freed from House Arrest, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
2009, at A1.
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It may also be possible to promote U.S. and allied national security
objectives vis a vis Iran through action before international tribunals. For
example:


It may be possible to bring an action before the International
Criminal Court (ICC) against Iranian Defense Minister Vahidi for
his involvement in the AMIA bombing.133 Alan Baker, former legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry of Israel, has stated that Vahidi ―carried out a crime which could probably be defined as a
crime against humanity,‖ noting that ―this has all the components
of being a crime that is within the framework of the ICC.‖134



Various international experts have called for pursuing legal action
against Iranian President Ahmadinejad on the basis that his calls
for the destruction of Israel are tantamount to incitement to genocide,135 which is prohibited by Article III (a) of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.136

IV. CONCLUSION
The increasing legalization of international relations has made lawfare an increasingly powerful alternative to traditional military means to
achieve operational objectives. Terrorist groups and their state sponsors are
seizing on this development by making explicit and sometimes effective use
of lawfare to achieve their operational objectives.
In contrast, the U.S. executive branch‘s response to law‘s potential
as a tool for advancing military objectives has thus far been predominantly
defensive. The U.S.‘s advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has thus far
been underutilized.
The remarkable impact of the limited deployment of lawfare against
Iran to date indicates that lawfare, deployed systematically and effectively,
may in some circumstances be able to save U.S. and foreign lives by signif133

Yaakov Lappin, Interpol: No warrant out for Iranian defense minister. Ahmad Vahidi
wanted by Argentina for allegedly masterminding the 1994 Buenos Aires Jewish center
bombing, Jerusalem Post, Sept. 8, 2009, at 5.
134
Id.
135
See, e.g., Irwin Cotler, Canada Must Get Serious About Iran, National Post, July 12,
2010, at http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2010/07/12/irwin-cotler-canada-must-getserious-about-iran/ (Cotler is the former Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada); Tovah Lazaroff & Allison T. Hoffman, Lawyers Lobby Against Iran’s Incitement, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 9, 2008, at http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=123779; ―The
Danger of a Nuclear, Genocidal and Rights-Violating Iran: The Responsibility to Prevent
Petition,‖ at http://genocidepreventionnow.org/Portals/0/docs/2010-R2P_IRAN_
RESOLUTION.pdf.
136
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm.
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icantly advancing U.S. national security objectives that would otherwise
require traditional warfare. These successes call into question the dominant
paradigm in the scholarly literature regarding sanctions, which derides multilateral sanctions as predominantly ineffective and unilateral sanctions as
almost always ineffective in a globalized economy.137 Perhaps the innovative types of lawfare-style sanctions described in this article represent a new
breed of more effective sanctions than those derided in the scholarly literature.
In light of lawfare‘s advantages over kinetic warfare, and the remarkable impact of the limited deployment of lawfare against Iran to date,
strong consideration should be given to broadening lawfare‘s application by
the United States and its allies. Each of the types of lawfare identified by
this article as being deployed against Iran in limited fashion could be replicated in additional sectors and applied to additional security challenges.
There is clearly room for much more vigorous deployment of state
and local lawfare measures. For example, the fact that twenty-seven states
have divested pension funds from companies doing business with Sudan
and nineteen states have divested pension funds from companies doing
business with Iran means there are twenty-three more states that still could
divest from Sudan and thirty-one additional states that still could divest
from Iran. In addition, Governor Pawlenty‘s effectiveness in putting Essar
to a choice between investing in Minnesota and building a refinery in Iran
means that there may be merit in putting together a comprehensive list of
where else in the United States Iran‘s key business partners are seeking to
invest and requesting subsidies and permits. Consideration could also be
given to applying state and local lawfare measures to a broader set of target
countries.
In light of the success of the Treasury Department‘s unprecedented
direct outreach to foreign banks and the success of the State Department‘s
subsequent similar direct outreach to foreign energy companies doing business with Iran, the Obama Administration, or a future administration, may
decide to try to replicate in other sectors the willingness to use economic
137

See, e.g., DANIEL DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10 (1999)(providing numerous quotes in which ―pundits and
policymakers have disparaged the use of sanctions in foreign policy‖ and noting that ―this
disdain mirrors the scholarly community‘s consensus about sanctions‖); DAVID BALDWIN,
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 51 (1985)(describing ―the literature on economic statecraft‖ as characterized by ―the nearly universal tendency to denigrate the utility of such tools of foreign
policy.‖) See also, e.g., Richard N. Haass, Sanctioning Madness, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec.
1997, at 75 (―the problem with economic sanctions is that they frequently contribute little to
American foreign policy goals while being costly and even counterproductive‖); id. at 77
(―In a global economy, unilateral sanctions impose higher costs on American firms than on
the target country‖); Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT‘L
SECURITY 90–136 (1997).
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and regulatory muscle to pursue national security objectives and the novel
tactic of direct outreach to individual foreign private institutions. If so, foreign companies in exceptionally globalized, strategic, regulated and information-rich sectors such as mobile telecommunications, the internet, and
transportation could be next in line. Before the U.S. government takes such
steps, it should analyze and weigh very carefully both the risk posed by
such measures to U.S. economic and regulatory preeminence in those sectors and the risk that such steps might set problematic precedents that could
be used against the United States by current or future adversaries.138 Moves
into additional sectors should be designed with an eye to minimizing those
risks.
Finally, the creative use of civil litigation and international tribunals
to achieve U.S. national security objectives is still at an early juncture. For
example, the application against proliferators of the types of civil litigation
tactics and precedents deployed against state sponsors of terrorism is still
mostly at the conceptual stage, and the efforts to bring Iranian President
Ahmadinejad before an international tribunal for incitement to genocide
have yet to succeed. The potential for the United States to more effectively
use civil litigation and international tribunals to achieve national security
objectives traditionally achieved by military means merits further study by
scholars, private practitioners, and government officials.
Lawfare‘s success in its limited deployment against Iran demonstrates lawfare‘s considerable potential as a tool for advancing U.S. national
security objectives with far less bloodshed than traditional warfare. The
U.S.‘s advantage in sophisticated legal weapons should not remain underutilized.

138

For example, the United States depends heavily on Chinese purchases of American
debt, a dependence which provides China with sig nificant leverage over the United States.
See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, China Losing Taste for Debt from the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2009, at A1.

